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Abstract: This paper contributes to an understanding of the historical 
development of management accounting by presenting an example 
of cost accounting practice in Portugal in the first half of the 18th 
century. It explores the integration of cost and financial accounting 
systems within a double- entry accounting framework by the Silk Fac-
tory Company (SFC) between 1745 and 1747. The SFC’s methods of 
product costing, pricing, inventory accounting, expense recognition, 
and production control are reviewed within the political, economic, 
and social context of Portugal at the time. The SFC is revealed to have 
used job-order product costing, with allocations of overhead costs, 
allowances for wastage and shrinkage, and elements of rudimentary 
standard costing. Our findings provide evidence of the existence of 
cost accounting and management control techniques at a private 
rather than a state-owned enterprise prior to the industrial revolution. 
INTRODUCTION
 This paper analyzes the management accounting system of 
one of the most important Portuguese manufacturing entities 
in the first half of the 18th century, the Silk Factory Company 
(Companhia da Fábrica das Sedas) (SFC), during its second ad-
ministration, 1745-1747 [National Archives of Portugal (Arqui-
vos Nacionais da Torre do Tombo) (ANTT hereafter), Conselho da 
Fazenda, Decretos, maço, 1699-1755; Neves, 1827, p. 41; Macedo, 
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1982, p. 97].1 The SFC had three administrations: the first from 
October 1734 to January 1745; the second, from February 1745 
to October 1747; and the third, from November 1747 to May 
1750. Upon its bankruptcy in May 1750, it became state-owned 
and known as the Royal Silk Factory (Real Fábrica das Sedas). 
 Although several books have survived from the first 
 administration of the company, only the accounting records 
from its second administration are analyzed here because it is 
only then that the company used a double-entry bookkeeping 
(DEB) system. The relevant records – journal (jornal), ledger 
(livro mestre),2 and inventory book (inventário) – were accessed 
at the ANTT. These records contain rich examples of cost ac-
counting techniques, such as job-order costing with overhead 
cost allocation. 
 We have three general aims: first, to explain the cost ac-
counting system of the SFC; second, to explore the accounting 
system of the SFC in the context of the ambient social, political, 
and economic context of Portugal; and, third, to contribute to 
an understanding of how and where management accounting 
techniques developed prior to the industrial revolution.3 
 Our exploration of the accounting system of the SFC 
reveals many useful insights to the development of manage-
ment accounting practice. Such insights arise because the 
 political, social, and economic context of Portugal during three 
years of the pre-industrial period, 1745-1747, is distinctive and 
under-explored in accounting history literature. The date of 
the accounting records analyzed is significant also because it 
precedes the first accounting book published in Portuguese, 
Exact Merchant and his Books of Accounts (Mercador Exacto nos 
1José Acúrsio das Neves, manager of the Royal Silk Factory from 1810-1821, 
wrote the administrative and economic history of the SFC. He described its foun-
dation as an historic occasion because it was the most important of all factories 
in Portugal and because its charter contained the same principles adopted sub-
sequently in the monopolist companies created by King D. José I (Joseph I). The 
only exception was the seventh paragraph of the charter which provided for the 
taxing of exports rather than imports. 
2The ledger is accompanied by a small book containing an index of accounts 
(Abecedário do Livro Mestre) in alphabetical order.
3In explaining the SFC’s cost accounting system, we do not focus, as did 
Macías [2002, p. 31], on exploring the role of a firm’s capital structure on “the 
parameters and uses of cost accounting information.”
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seus Livros de Contas)] by João Baptista Bonavie in 17584 and 
precedes the foundation of the Portuguese School of Commerce 
(Aula do Comércio) in Lisbon in 1759.5
 We draw from a rich vein of under-explored archival mate-
rial to provide fresh comparative counterpoints to the bulk of ex-
isting analyses of manufacturing accounting history which have 
been written from a predominantly Anglo-Saxon vantage point. 
We elicit information to sustain or refute existing conjectures 
about manufacturing accounting developments on the Iberian 
Peninsula. The results will be useful in evaluating the findings 
of many previous studies. Primary sources relied upon include 
several of the 1,115 accounting books written between 1734 and 
1835 which are available in the ANTT. They are catalogued there 
under the name of the SFC’s successor company, the Royal Silk 
Factory. Appendix 1 classifies this inventory and the 34 books 
accessible for the SFC’s operations in the period 1734 to 1750.
 Although manufacturing and industrial accounting has 
been studied in depth after the Industrial Revolution, there are 
fewer case studies of such accounting before the second half 
of the 19th century. This is consistent with the observations of 
 Carmona [2004, 2005] that “accounting history research pub-
lished in international journals focuses overwhelmingly on the 
narrow time segment of 1850-1940.” According to Boyns et al. 
[1998, p. 398] and Boyns and Edwards [1997, p. 2], few cost 
accounting texts focus on industrial accounting practice before 
1750, apart from Moschetti [1610],6 Monteage [1683], Collins 
[1697], North [1714], and Dodson [1750]. Few scholarly papers 
in the English language analyze cases of manufacturing account-
ing before the second half of the 19th century. The principal 
4There is some dispute about the identity of the first Portuguese accounting 
book. Yamey [1969] and Bywater and Yamey [1982, p. 9] claim that the first such 
books were published in Portuguese by Bonavie (1758) and by an anonymous 
author (Tratado Sobre as Partidas Dobradas por Meyo da Qual Podem Aprender a 
Arrumar as Contas nos Livros (Treatise on Accounting Using Double-Entry Book-
keeping), 1764; and that both these books “correspond closely” with (plagiarize?) 
Barrême’s book, Traité des Parties Doubles (Treatise on Double-Entry Bookkeep-
ing), 1721. 
5This school is alleged, in the Portuguese literature at least, to be the first gov-
ernment-sponsored school of commerce in the world. Four subjects were taught: 
arithmetic, algebra, and geometry; exchange, weights, and measures; insurance; 
and the DEB method [Rodrigues et al., 2003, 2004]. 
6According to Sá [1998, pp. 59-60], this is the first book dedicated to indus-
trial accounting.
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exceptions are papers with an Anglo-Saxon bias [e.g., Edwards, 
1989; Fleischman and Parker, 1990, 1991; Edwards and Newell, 
1991; Fleischman et al., 1995, 1996; Boyns and Edwards, 1997; 
Fleischman and Tyson, 1998] and papers focusing exclusively on 
examples from Spain [e.g., Carmona et al., 1997; Carmona and 
Macías, 2001; Carmona and Gómez, 2002; Carmona and Dono-
so, 2004; Gutiérrez et al., 2005; Martínez Guillén, 2005; Romero 
Fúnez, 2005] and those from Italy [e.g., Zan, 2004; Zambon and 
Zan, 2005]. Several papers in languages other than English [e.g., 
in French, by Nitikin, 1994] deal with cost accounting develop-
ments in other countries. There are some comparative studies 
[e.g., Boyns et al., 1998] of the similarities and differences in 
industrial accounting prior to 1880 between Britain and France. 
Carmona [2006] provides an instructive review of the history 
of management accounting in four European Latin countries: 
Spain, France, Italy, and Portugal.
 We concur with Boyns and Edwards [2000], Hoskin and 
Macve [2000], Fleischman and Tyson [1998], and Fleischman 
et al. [1995], among others, that it is desirable to conduct 
 further research into cost and management accounting history 
by examining business records in a wide variety of countries. 
We contend that Portugal should be one of the countries for 
which such further research is needed and likely to be insight-
ful. In Carmona’s [2006] review of management accounting 
history in four countries of Continental Europe, the focus is 
preponderantly on the histories of Spain and France, and to a 
lesser degree Italy, with only a brief mention of the development 
of management accounting in Portugal. Accordingly, this paper 
adds to extant literature by presenting, in English, an example 
of cost accounting practices, 1745-1747, in a privately owned, 
Portuguese, silk textiles manufacturing company. Analysis of the 
SFC’s accounting system has the potential to enhance under-
standing because of the SFC’s distinctive geo-political context, 
the time period, the SFC’s private ownership, and the strong 
competition the company faced from imports and small firms. 
 We begin by discussing relevant previous literature on early 
cost and management accounting practices. Then we present a 
brief historical background of Portugal in the 18th century and 
a brief historical overview of the SFC. Thereafter, we outline the 
operation of the SFC’s management accounting system, high-
lighting its distinctive features and formative influences. The 
final section discusses our findings and conclusions. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW
 A growing body of research has concluded that sophisti-
cated cost accounting techniques were used before the second 
half of the 19th century [see, for example, Gutiérrez et al., 2005]. 
This is contrary to some earlier management accounting his-
toriography [see Fleischman and Parker, 1991, citing Solomons, 
1952; Garner, 1954; Pollard, 1965; Kaplan, 1984]. Pollard [1965], 
for example, contended that high profit margins and the absence 
of competition provided little incentive for firms to adopt cost 
accounting during the British Industrial Revolution. However, 
Fleischman and Parker [1990, p. 220] have argued that some 
 notable innovative cost accounting methods were used in the 
U.K. between 1760 and 1850. They cite the accounting practices 
of the Carron Company, a Scottish ironworks, in which the cost 
accounting processes “appear to have been motivated by the 
firm’s early problems with securing adequate partnership capi-
tal, attaining profitability, and maintaining liquidity.” 
 Carmona et al. [1997, p. 412] analyzed the cost accounting 
system used by a large, state-owned tobacco factory in Spain, the 
Royal Tobacco Factory of Seville (RTF). They argued that intense 
competition most likely stimulated cost calculations which could 
be used in a quest to improve firm efficiency and strengthen 
competitive position. Nonetheless, they contended that in the 
case of the RTF, linking the emergence of cost accounting purely 
to the logic of profits “yields only a partial explanation of the 
cost accounting phenomenon” and that the development of cost 
accounting practices at the RTF was part of a strong disciplinary 
regime7 which aimed to minimize opportunities for tobacco theft 
and facilitate the surveillance of factory labor. Cost account-
ing techniques assumed this disciplining role, prompted by the 
importance of tobacco revenue to the State Treasury. Because 
of problems in ensuring effective visual supervision, the cost 
accounting system calculated expected costs of direct labor and 
material consumption for each phase of the production process.
 In a similar vein, Carmona and Donoso [2004] studied the 
role of cost accounting systems in enforcing public policy in 
early regulated (monopoly) markets at the Royal Soap Factory 
of Seville (RSF) (1525-1692). They found that a complex system 
of cost calculation had been the basis for price negotiations for 
7Romero Fúnez [2005] develops this point by analyzing the regulations of the 
RTF. He concludes that the RTF’s accounting system contributed to a “spirit of 
discipline,” aimed at ensuring the behavior of individuals complied with require-
ments under the regulations. 
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many years and that centuries before the advent of scientific 
management in the late 19th century, the RSF’s raw materials 
standards anticipated the introduction of standards based on 
expectations from prior results. Martínez Guillén [2005, p. 101] 
analyzed a memorandum authored by Antonio Bordázar de 
 Artazu in 1732 (13 years before our analysis period), in which 
a costing model is presented for use in the Spanish printing 
industry. Bordázar’s model is significant for two major reasons: 
first, it advocates cost-based retail price calculations in order to 
help challenge a monopoly within a strictly regulated market; 
and second, it includes “concepts such as the imputation of in-
direct costs, application of interest and the separation of direct 
and indirect wages. In addition, the retail price was determined 
as a multiple of the total cost of the books.” 
 Gutiérrez et al. [2005] applied the model used by Fleisch-
man and Parker [1991] and concluded that sophisticated cost 
accounting practices existed in Spain before 1800. The surveys 
of company practices by Fleischman and Parker [1991] and 
Gutiérrez et al. [2005], although differing considerably in terms 
of their political, institutional, and social contexts, both suggest 
the emergence of modern cost accounting after 1760. The survey 
of Spanish practices by Gutiérrez et al. [2005] was conducted 
predominantly in monopoly companies and in an environment 
of government (or crown) intervention. In contrast, the focus 
of Fleischman and Parker [1991] was on UK companies which 
were predominantly subject to private ownership and non-
interventionist governments. Gutiérrez et al. [2005] contend 
that sophisticated costing emerged in Spain as the cumulative 
result of two sets of factors. First, there were economic factors. 
Because the textile industry was open to foreign and national 
competition, most managers required information for decision 
making because of the business complexities they faced. Second, 
there were political factors. Most factories analyzed were related 
closely to the crown. Gutiérrez et al. [2005] claim that the royal 
textile factories faced financial difficulties because of the high 
levels of capital investment they required, the need to integrate 
activities, high transport costs, and the lack of skilled workers. 
Such difficulties, especially the financial one, are argued plau-
sibly to have prompted Spanish textile companies to monitor 
and control costs more closely and to use innovative accounting 
techniques [Carmona and Gómez, 2002, p. 237]. Of particular 
concern was the impact of fixed costs since the interest on debt 
was substantial and the salaries of accountants and managers 
were very high.
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 Fleischman et al. [1995] argue that firms focused initially on 
controlling raw materials, and then turned to the develop-
ment of proper techniques to evaluate and assess production 
 processes and operational performance. Using the accounts of 
the Royal Textile Mill of Guadalajara (RTM), 1717-1744, as a 
case study, Carmona and Gómez [2002] contend that the RTM’s 
cost accounting techniques concentrated on control of raw 
materials and waste, control of labour and management, and 
allocation of overhead to determine product cost. However, be-
cause of the lack of expertise in textile manufacturing in Spain 
in the early 18th century, the state-owned RTM company hired 
experienced Dutch workers who received high fixed salaries. In 
this context, Carmona and Gómez [2002, p. 248] found that the 
“RTM deployed standards of control for labour either before, or 
contemporaneously with, the implementation of standard costs 
for raw materials.” Their findings are inconsistent with those 
of Fleischman et al. [1995] who argue that because control of 
labor requires a higher degree of sophistication than control 
of raw materials, accounting controls for labor usually were 
developed after accounting controls for raw materials. How-
ever, as Carmona [2005] has noted, the evidence is mixed about 
whether standards for control of raw materials preceded those 
for labor. Some results [e.g., Zan, 2004; Zambon and Zan, 2005] 
are consistent with those of Fleischman et al. [1995], whereas 
other results show the simultaneous use of control standards for 
materials and labor [Carmona et al., 1997, 2002].
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Political, Economic, and Social Context of Portugal: In the 
western world of the first half of the millennium, Italian city-
states, such as Venice, dominated international commerce with 
the East. Their accounting was highly developed and their busi-
nessmen were well educated. However, in 1498, this dominance 
was put at risk by the discovery by Portugal’s Vasco da Gama 
of the sea route to India, via the Cape of Good Hope. Portugal 
exploited this discovery. It gained trading advantages with Asia 
and maintained them for fifty years [see Peres, 1959; Godinho, 
1962, 1981; Boxer, 1969; Livermore, 1976; Serrão, 1980]. Mer-
chants from Italian city-states came to Lisbon seeking to profit 
from the Portuguese advantage, bringing with them knowledge 
of DEB techniques. 
 Portugal’s influence as a colonizing nation flourished in 
the first decades of the 16th century but was soon eclipsed by 
7
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the rise of other major colonial powers. Portuguese affluence 
began to decline during the reign of King D. João III (John III) 
between 1521 and 1557. A major reason for this was the onset 
of the Portuguese Inquisition in 1531. This prompted a signifi-
cant number of Portuguese Jews, who had played an important 
role in Portuguese discoveries, to leave the country [Kayserling, 
1971; Livermore, 1976, p. 147; Tavares, 1995; Nogueira, 2001; 
Rodrigues et al., 2003; Rodrigues and Craig, 2004, p. 341]. The 
loss of influential merchants was accompanied also by the flight 
of much capital from Portugal and the depletion of the country’s 
entrepreneurial skills [Marques, 1984; Rodrigues et al., 2003]. 
The Portuguese Inquisition was on-going and adversely affected 
many influential businessmen, progressively weakened the bour-
geoisie, and helped lead Portugal to “abysm and ruin” [Kayser-
ling, 1971, p. 284]. 
 During the reign of King D. Pedro II (Peter II) (1668-1706), 
when Portugal was under the governship of the Count of 
Ericeira, the country experienced economic difficulties. It at-
tempted to develop industry by encouraging manufacturing ac-
tivity. Throughout the country, factory systems were established 
to operate in concert with artisan workshops and a domestic 
cottage industry. Artisans required very little capital and low-
priced equipment. However, with the transition to manufactur-
ing, large sums of capital and a large workforce were needed. In 
1677, King D. Pedro II authorized Rolando Duclos to establish a 
silk factory. A complex industrial entity with fifty silk looms and 
about one thousand workers was constructed [Macedo, 1982, p. 
37]. A supporting infrastructure of medieval guilds developed 
around the factory. To help ensure a stable workforce, protec-
tion was given to the factory by the king. Factory workers could 
not terminate their employment unless other workers were 
available to replace them [Macedo, 1982, p. 251]. In the same 
way, the Bragança8 silk factory, which was in a state of decline 
at the time, was supported by the king who summoned experts 
and technicians from Toledo to teach silk producers appropriate 
techniques and methods [Sousa, 2005, p. 2].
 During the first half of the 18th century, Portugal benefited 
from the flow of diamonds and gold from Brazil. The Portuguese 
court became one of the richest in Europe [Serrão, 1996]. Never-
theless, the economy was under-industrialized in comparison 
with other European nations [Marques, 1984; Maxwell, 1995]. 
8Bragança is located in Trás-Os-Montes, in Portugal’s northeastern interior, 
bordering Spain.
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After the death of the Count of Ericeira in 1690, interest in 
manufacturing declined, so much so that in the first quarter of 
the 18th century, silk manufacturing activity was conducted only 
in artisan workshops and in a “cottage system” [Macedo, 1982, 
p. 70].
 The ideals of the Enlightenment, imported from France 
during the reign of King D. João V (John V) (1706-1750), spread 
slowly in Portugal. The king wanted to modernize Portugal and 
expand its power, but he had only limited success. The economy 
was under-industrialized and in decay. Attempts to industrialize 
were not pursued as vigorously as they had been, in part be-
cause it was easier to derive wealth from shipments of gold from 
Portugal’s colony in Brazil [Almeida, 1989-90, p. 1]. Portugal’s 
generous commercial treaties with England also were a disin-
centive to industrialization [Macedo, 1982].9 
 Applying the French model, D. João V sought to expand 
his power base and to modernize the country, thereby reinforc-
ing an absolute monarchical regime in Portugal [Livermore, 
1976; Marques, 1984]. Despite such political reforms, the strong 
conservatism, cultural backwardness, and religious intolerance 
of Portugal provided a weak base for the adoption of Enlight-
enment ideals [Fonseca, 2000]. The Inquisition, through its 
censorship of many books, helped suppress intellectual creativ-
ity and promoted hostility to innovation [Marques, 1984]. The 
Catholic Church was wealthy and dominated teaching, but it 
did not teach accounting. Rates of illiteracy were very high and 
the nobility did not value education or business [Azevedo, 1929; 
Rodrigues et al., 2003].
 In the 1730s, interest in silk manufacturing activity was re-
kindled [Macedo, 1982, p. 72], but many problems had to be ad-
dressed. Administrators, for example, lacked management skills 
and knowledge of how to market manufactured products effec-
tively [Macedo, 1982, p. 72]. Portugal began to imitate French 
mercantilism [Dias, 1984, pp. 142-150, 212-213). Influenced by 
Colbert’s example in France, Cardeal da Mota, the prime min-
ister of D. João V, supported the development of big to acquire 
the  corporations operated by privileged bourgeoisie [Falcon, 
2005]. He encouraged industry to acquire the skills of foreign 
artisans and craftsmen. A popular model for establishing a 
9From 1661, Portugal had a political alliance with England. This was strength-
ened in 1703 with the Metween Treaty establishing special conditions, including a 
reduction in taxes, for the export of Portuguese wine to England. It also removed 
restrictions on the import of English textiles into Portugal.
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manufacturing operation involved inviting a foreigner to initiate 
the project, and later to invite the participation of Portuguese 
partners. According to Macedo [1982, p. 72], the social and eco-
nomic structure which supported Portugal’s keenness to engage 
in manufacturing between 1720 and 1740 was characterized by 
“improvisation,” insufficient capital, and lack of technical and 
administrative skills. The SFC was regarded as one of the most 
important activities of the new manufacturing era. It was the 
largest manufacturing company operating during the reign of D. 
João V [Almeida, 1989-90, p .2]. Although there were only a few 
factories in Portugal at the time, there were many artisan work-
shops and many vestiges of a cottage industry system.
 The accounting at the SFC, which we explore, was con-
ducted in the transition from the cottage industry10 to the in-
dustrial revolution era. This transition period, which witnessed 
the initial uses of a factory system, is often described as the 
manufacturing era. To better understand the accounting at the 
SFC, in a footnote we provide a brief outline of the 18th century 
Portuguese systems of weight (arrátel), length (côvado), and cur-
rency (real).11 
Brief History of the SFC: The SFC was created in 1734 as a pri-
vate company by the Frenchman Robert Godin, with financial 
support from wealthy backers and authorization from King D. 
João V. Godin received a charter on February 25, 173412 from 
the king, granting him many privileges, including monopoly 
rights to produce silk for 20 years (no further silk factories could 
be created without Godin’s permission, para. 2 of the charter), 
tax exemptions for ten years from a wide variety of taxes (para. 
6), no import tax on raw materials (paras. 7 and 8), exemptions 
of employees from military service (para. 6), and execution of 
10This describes a system in which materials were put in an artisan’s work-
shop or in a person’s home to be transformed into products. 
11One arrátel was 459 grams or 16 onças (ounces). 32 arráteis (plural of arrátel) 
constituted one arroba. In this paper, we represent arrátel with the notation “a.” A 
côvado was 0.66 meters and was written Cdo . Percent was written as pCt 
 The monetary unit was a real (plural réis, and abbreviated to rs.). To indi-
cate one thousand réis, a $ was written, followed by three zeros. Thus, 2,000 réis 
was written as 2$000. A million réis was written using a colon (:). Thus, 5,000,000 
réis was 5:000$000. Tables presented by Mata and Valério [1993, p. 279] help us to 
understand the relationship between réis in 1745 and their conversion into euros 
in 2000; approximately 25 réis in 1745 are equivalent to €1 in 2000. One thousand 
réis are equivalent to approximately €39, and one million réis to €39,000.
12Neves [1827] states that the original charter was destroyed in the 1755 Lis-
bon earthquake. A copy of the charter has survived.
10
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the company’s debts as royal debts (para. 20). However, the king 
insisted also that compulsory preference be given to Portuguese 
raw materials and labor (especially in the case of apprentices, 
para. 14); and that the factory be audited annually by the state 
(paras. 10, 11, and 12) [ANTT, Ministério do Reino, book 167, 
sheet 211; ANTT, Cartórios Notariais de Lisboa, Cartório no. 11, 
book 526, sheets 4-6 and 8V-9; Neves, 1827, pp. 25-40; Macedo, 
1982, pp. 251-256].
 Godin and his partners13 raised capital and formed a joint 
stock company. The company produced silk products trimmed 
with gold and silver, velvet, damasks, grogram, brocades, satins, 
taffetas, and gold and silver laces [Santos, 2002]. The SFC en-
ticed expert designers and craftsmen to Portugal from France 
and commenced operations in a modest factory in Fonte San-
tana, where Godin lived. In 1738, the SFC established itself in a 
new and large factory in Rato, Lisbon, even though construction 
of the factory was not finished until 1741. In 1749, there were 
100 assembled looms in the factory [ANTT, Conselho de Guerra, 
Decretos, maço 258; Neves, 1827; Santos, 2002].
 The administrators of the company were elected by the part-
ners. They supervised three main offices: general administration, 
sales administration, and accounting [ANTT, Cartórios Notariais 
de Lisboa, Cartório no. 11, book 526, sheets 4V-6V]. The directors 
of the first Administration were Manoel Nunes da Silva Tojal, 
Francisco Ferraz de Oliveira, and Domingos da Silva Vieira. Af-
ter the death of Ferraz de Oliveira and Silva Vieira, Tojal was left 
as the sole administrator, but he acted with the advice of Manuel 
de Sande de Vasconcelos [ANTT, Conselho da Guerra, Decretos, 
maço 258]. The administrators were responsible for purchases, 
sales, payments, maintenance of the accounting books, and gen-
eral decision making. Godin provided technical advice on the 
manufacturing operations [Almeida, 1989-90].
 At the end of October 1734, the capital of the company was 
16 million réis (40 shares of 400$000 each). However, the capi-
tal needs increased quickly with the construction of the large 
13They were: Manoel Nunes da Silva Tojal, Manoel de Sande de Vasconcelos, 
Francisco Xavier Ferraz de Oliveira, João de Castro Carneiro, Manoel da Costa 
 Pinheiro, Domingos da Silva Vieira, D. Gabriel António Gomes, Christian Stockler, 
and Domingos da Cruz Lisboa. Godin did not subscribe any capital, but he was 
considered to be a partner who gave to the company his knowledge and “his intel-
ligence and activity” [ANTT, Cartórios Notariais de Lisboa, Cartório no. 11, book 
526, sheet V]. Godin received an annual salary of 480$000. He received a smaller 
amount of dividends “because he did not deliver any capital” [ANTT, Cartórios 
Notariais de Lisboa, Cartório no. 11, book 526, sheet 6V].
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factory at Rato between 1735 and 1741 [Neves, 1827]. By May 
1742, capital had risen to approximately 61.2 million réis (153 
shares) [partners’ share register book (entrada de sócios) no. 
980].14 Soon the company’s capital needs were such that it had 
to borrow money, repayable with interest. 
 In addition to the manufacturing plant, the building had 
six retail shops. There were several offices housing the com-
mercial staff (a merchant specializing in sewing silk, a merchant 
specializing in wool and silk, a general director of sales, a clerk 
and a director of production) and the directors of the company. 
Several employees of the company lived in the same building 
(the bookkeeper, the clerk, and the doorkeeper). The SFC’s 
staff also included silk weavers, silk manufacturers, foremen, 
designers,15 sock makers, lace makers, dyers, a storekeeper, 
blacksmiths, carpenters, two cooks, a water carrier, a doctor, 
and a nurse [Macedo, 1982]. In 1749, “the factory employed 
200 men (specialized workers and artisans) and approximately 
one thousand female silk winders. The factory also contracted 
many silk throwers, gold and silver drawers, carpenters, turners, 
joiners and blacksmiths” [ANTT, Conselho de Guerra, Decretos, 
maço 258]. Many of the specialized foreign workers were French 
[Almeida, 1989-90].
 On July 3, 1745, the cashier and administrator of the SFC, 
Manuel Nunes da Silva Tojal, was advised by the government 
auditor that the company had sustained a very sizable operat-
ing loss of 18:796$990 from its inception through to August 
1744 [ANTT, Conselho da Fazenda, Maço, Decretos, 1725 e anos 
seguintes]. The company’s capital had been exhausted by the 
construction of the new factory in Rato. A memorial written by 
Godin on September 1, 1749 revealed that the first administra-
tion had expended 31:037$875 réis building the new factory. 
In the period, salaries and gratuities totalling 32:644$800 réis 
were paid as well [ANTT, Conselho da Guerra, Decretos, maço 
258]. Manufacturing was undertaken in the face of strong ex-
ternal competition from legal imports and contraband products 
[Macedo, 1982, p. 72; Pedreira, 1994, p. 40], and the SFC was 
not profitable.
14This amount corresponds to 1.2% of the large amount received in gold from 
Brazil in 1745 (about 5,200 million réis) [Mauro, 1991, p. 247]. Besides the capi-
tal subscription, the partners loaned the company 21:000$000, bringing the total 
amount delivered by the partners to 82:200$00 (ANTT, Conselho da Guerra, Decre-
tos, maço 258). That amount corresponds to 1.6% of the amount received in gold 
from Brazil in 1745.
15The fist designer was a Frenchman, Mr. Alezon [Santos, 2002].
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 To help ease the difficult trading situation faced by the SFC, 
the Companhia da China (China Company) was created in June 
1741. It was granted privileges in the commercial traffic with 
Macau for a period of 16 years.16 The charter of 1741 suggested 
that this company “would improve both companies, consoli-
dated in only one” [ANTT, Chancellaria de D. João V, book 102, 
sheets 270V-272V]. The objective was to help the SFC obtain 
silk foliage which was much cheaper in Macau than in Europe 
[Almeida, 1989-90, p. 7]. The elected administrators (Christian 
Stockler, Manuel Passos Dias, Rodrigo de Sande de Vasconcelos, 
and Manoel Nunes da Silva Tojal) prepared the statutes of the 
new company, whose capitalization was open to public subscrip-
tion. The close relationship between commercial and industrial 
activities created hope that the prosperity of commerce would 
extend to the manufacturing sector [Almeida, 1989-90].
 On July 4, 1745, Godin requested that the king extend these 
privileges for a further ten years. Godin argued that the partners 
had not benefited from their investment in such a “fantastic fac-
tory, one of the biggest of its type, which has become of public 
interest not only because of the silks produced but also because 
of the many craftsmen employed” [ANTT, Conselho da Fazenda, 
Maço, Decretos, 1725 e seguintes]. However, neither the granting 
of the extension of the privileges for a further ten years nor the 
stopping of major expenses related to the building construction 
was sufficient to help the company recover its poor financial 
situation [Macedo, 1982, p. 71; Pedreira, 1994, p. 40]. The SFC’s 
financial deficit made it impossible to take advantage of the 
industrial and commercial privileges it had received [Macedo, 
1982]. 
 The second administration was conducted by Ma-
noel de Sande Vasconcelos, Christian Stockler, and Manoel 
Nunes da Silva Tojal. Christian Stockler was a consul who 
represented the City of Hamburg in Lisbon. There were se-
rious disagreements between Godin and Stockler [ANTT, 
Conselho da Guerra, Decretos, maço 258; Almeida, 1989-90]. 
Godin accused Stockler of incompatibility on the grounds 
that it would be impossible to promote the commercial in-
terests of Portugal and Hamburg at the same time [ANTT, 
Conselho de Guerra, Decretos, maço 258]. It seems that the 
SFC’s financial problems were compounded by personal-
ity differences and discipline problems [Almeida, 1989-90]. Al- 
16However, since the company was in a difficult financial situation, the num-
ber of ships per year never exceeded one [Macedo, 1982].
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though Stockler was replaced17 in the third administration, the 
company failed in 1750. The cause was attributed to the high 
costs of property and of training personnel [Neves, 1827]. This 
was not surprising in view of the criticism by Sebastião José 
de Carvalho e Melo,18 better know as the Marquis of Pombal, of 
the strategy the company had adopted. In a letter written from 
London to Marco António de Azevedo Coutinho, the secretary 
of state for war and foreign affairs to King D. João V, Pombal 
noted that unlike the big and expensive factory the SFC had 
just constructed in Rato, in London he could see only small and 
cheap factories [Macedo, 1982; Barreto, 1986]. Pombal [1741a] 
contended that companies should be small and cheap to make it 
easier for them to be profitable. Pombal, who was later foreign 
affairs minister (1750-1755) and chief minister (1756-1777) in 
the Portuguese government, had a very influential impact on 
Portuguese economic thinking of the time [Rodrigues and Craig, 
2004, pp. 333-337].19 It was under Pombal’s leadership that the 
SFC was transformed into the Royal Silk Factory, a state-owned 
enterprise.
ACCOUNTING SYSTEM OF THE SFC
 The SFC factory was surrounded by houses in which strands 
of raw silk were produced from silk cocoons. They were then 
passed to the factory for processing into finished silk products. 
The production cycle was:
silk filament Ë raw silk thread Ë dyed silk Ë  
reeled silk Ë silk fabrics Ë finished silk clothes
 An integrated accounting system using DEB and job-order 
costing computed full costs of units produced. It was allied with 
17The third administration was conducted by Rodrigo de Sande de Vasconce-
los, Manoel Nunes da Silva Tojal, and Francisco Ferreira da Silva.
18He acquired the title, Marquis of Pombal, in 1769. In 1741, he was the am-
bassador of the Portuguese King D. João V to the English Court of King George II. 
In this letter, Pombal advised the King that in England the small manufacturing 
operations he observed there were not experiencing the same financial problems 
as were being experienced in Portugal because the English firms did not have the 
same structure and amount of costs. Pombal stated that the value of the building 
where the Silk Company was established was greater than all the similar compa-
nies established in London and surrounding regions [Pombal, 1741a].
19Pombal’s “Report on Grievances” to the king of Portugal in 1741 is regarded 
by many, such as Barreto [1986], to be one of the most important expressions of 
Portuguese economic thought in the first half of the 18th century.
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a charge and discharge system of accounting in which admin-
istrators and artisans were each accountable for the materials 
disbursed to them. The quality of production was controlled and 
the cost per côvado was computed. Artisans were discharged 
from responsibility for raw materials when they forwarded 
finished products. Stocks were valued at an average estimated 
cost. Expense control was achieved by comparing the variance 
between allocated costs and actual costs. Administrators were 
responsible for controlling expenses, rendering accounts, and 
paying creditors. The central account was a “finished goods” 
account (fazendas em ser na mão da administração da venda das 
fazendas da fábrica; literally, “finished fabrics held by the sales 
administration”). 
Cost Calculation and the Finished Goods Account: The computed 
cost of each job was entered in the factory invoices book (livro 
de facturas da fábrica). For the first job order, direct costs were 
71$540 réis and indirect costs were 15$022 réis, with total costs 
of 86$562 réis. The output was 66½ côvados so that the unit 
cost was approximately 1$301 réis per côvado. During Febru-
ary 1745, 20 job orders were completed, comprising 1323.25 
côvados, or approximately 873 meters of silk, at a total cost of 
réis 2:776$272. Job number 1, the first of 20 pieces completed 
on February 28, 1745, is recorded in the “account of cost” as fol-
lows [ANTT, book no. 676, p. 1]:
Figure 1
Job-order cost sheet, sFc, February 28, 1745
No. 1 1st Piece -66 1/2 côvados of brilliant grey colour produced by Loom no. 76
by Vicente Febregat
a  9 " 15 " weight of the piece [9 arratéis and 15 ounces]
a  - “ 10 " loss
a  10 " 9 " of dyed silk @ 4000 réis. rs. 42$250
salary of the artisan and foremen @ 260 rs. per C.do [by côvado] " 17$290
salary of the apprentice @ 150 rs. by C.do "  9$900
Silk reeling @ 200 rs. per a [by arrátel] "  2$100
    "  71$540
interest @ 6 p C.t  "  4$292
general factory expenses @ 3 p C.t "   2$146
wages @ 6 p C.t  "   4$292
letting of the house and looms @ 6 p C.t "   4$292
    " 86$562
We have 66 1/2 C.do s. The cost per côvado is 1$301 réis and the 
remainder is 45½ réis.
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 Full cost per côvado was defined in a fashion similar to the 
French prix de revient, the total cost accounting system that 
 Nikitin [1990] found at Saint-Gobain between 1820 and 1880 
and that Bordázar proposed in the Spanish printing industry 
in 1732 [Martínez Guillén, 2005]. As with Bordázar’s proposal, 
there is an indirect imputation of costs and a separation be-
tween wages of workers directly involved with silk production 
and those who were not. Estimated overheads were applied in 
a consistent fashion as a set percentage of direct costs. Indirect 
wages, interest, and costs of “letting of the house and looms” 
were allocated at 6% of total direct costs, and general factory 
expenses at 3%. Because the SFC had obtained a charter with 
monopoly rights, managers believed that the fair sales price 
could be calculated by adding the “cost price” and a fair profit. 20 
Accordingly, calculation of the “cost price” (full cost of products) 
was most important. Note that at the RTM of Guadalajara in 
1742, indirect salaries of “the superintendent and the personnel 
employed in the accounting and cash offices and in the ware-
houses” were allocated (at the rate of one-eighth of their yearly 
wages) to the cost of the white twill [Carmona and Gómez, 2002, 
p. 246]. It is also relevant to note that in the costing model pro-
posed by Bordázar in 1732 [Martínez Guillén, 2005], cost was 
increased by 5% per year to reflect the financial interest costs 
likely to be incurred in storing finished goods (books) for several 
years. In the case of the SFC, the imputation of interest costs 
arose because the company had to borrow a large sum of money 
to construct the new factory in Rato.
 The integration of cost accounting and financial accounting 
can be seen in the journal and ledger. For instance, at the end of 
February, the following entry was recorded in the journal [ANTT, 
book no. 720, pp. 13-14]:
 DR. Finished Goods 2:776$272
 CR. Creditors21 2:776$272
 During the month of February, 20 pieces of silk were pro-
duced by the looms and were delivered to the Administration:
20This reasoning was wrong since, as Sousa [2005] argues, the silk industry 
was the most important sector of Trás-os-Montes. Records show that in 1721-
1724, Bragança had 30 registered spinning wheels and 350 looms. Freixo de Es-
pada à Cinta, another city in the region, had more than 100 looms.
21“Creditors” here means all costs that contribute to the finished goods.
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Figure 2
items transferred to Finished goods inventory, sFc, 
February 1745
 1st Piece  – 66 1/2 côvados of brilliant grey colour   86$562
 2nd Piece – 46 1/2 côvados of black and silver grogram 157$344
 3rd Piece – 74 côvados of black Grodetur  98$701
 4th Piece – 100 côvados of black Grodetur 135$713
 5th Piece – 45 1/4 côvados of white and gold grogram 187$755
 6th Piece – 80 côvados of black skirt 144$728
 7th Piece – 44 3/4 côvados of purple and gold satin 340$314
 (7 pieces – 457 côvados)  1:151$117
 (next page)
 (7 pieces – 457 côvados)  1:151$117
 8th Piece – 45 1/4 côvados of purple and gold satin 349$374
 9 th Piece – 94 côvados of mantles  82$103
10th Piece – 92 côvados of white serge  58$170
11th Piece – 99 1/2 côvados of mantles  84$268
12th Piece – 89 côvados of black Nobreza  64$363
13th Piece – 45 1/2 côvados of green grogram  96$025
14th Piece – 48 côvados of blue Persiana  68$216
15th Piece – 45 1/2 côvados of silver grogram  263$422
16th Piece – 68 1/2 côvados of black grogram 81$535
17th Piece – 66 côvados of brilliant gold colour  70$336
18th Piece – 36 côvados of white and gold damask  191$134
19th Piece – 92 côvados of brilliant cinnamon-colour  118$039
20th Piece – 48 côvados of black skirts  98$180
20 pieces – 1323 ¼ côvados 2:776$272
 Dyed silks of 20 pieces 935$875
 Expenses of artisans and foremen of 20 pieces   444$205 
 Expenses of apprentices of 20 pieces  230$509
 Silk reeling  46$294
 Interests 137$684
 Factory general expenses  68$337
 Wages  137$684
 Letting the house, factory and looms    137$684
   2:138$272
 Gold, silver strand  638$000
   2:776$272
The double-entry system facilitated computation of the value of 
finished goods at the end of the period (2:776$272). Such a value 
was computed using information in the account that recorded 
the cost of each job order. For example, the cost of the first piece 
(86$562) was the first debit in the finished goods account. This 
sum was obtained from the invoice book, the book of cost ac-
count. Such a treatment provides evidence of the integration 
of the SFC’s cost and financial accounting systems. The SFC’s 
17
Carvalho et al.: Early cost accounting practices and private ownership: The Silk Factory Company of Portugal, 1745-1747
Published by eGrove, 2007
Accounting Historians Journal, June 200774  
integration of costing procedures into its double-entry account-
ing system, like such systems elsewhere, had the potential to 
give “managers improved control over operations” [Edwards 
and Newell, 1991, p. 48]. This was because there was less chance 
of omitting costs within the more secure double-entry account-
ing framework. All transactions which supported the costing of 
products were recorded. The SFC provides evidence additional 
to that gathered for the coal, iron, and steel industries to show 
that the “two branches into which accounting is today conven-
tionally categorized – financial and costing – rather than devel-
oping from separate beginnings, as was previously believed, in 
certain industries at least grew naturally out of a single system” 
(Boyns and Edwards, 1997, p. 20]. At the SFC, costing informa-
tion was provided jointly with important information about 
products.
 During the SFC’s second administration, there were 663 job 
orders for silk products and monthly orders for silk stockings. 
Product costs were determined as full costs, using a job-order 
costing system. Each job order included, as direct costs, dyed 
silk at an estimated cost based on weight (including a shrinkage 
loss), salaries of artisans and foremen (paid by piece), salaries 
of apprentices (paid by piece), and silk reeling (paid by weight 
unit). Indirect costs were comprised of interest (6% of direct 
costs), factory general expenses and indirect materials (3% of 
direct cost), indirect labor wages (6% of direct cost), and rent on 
the house, factory, and looms (6% of direct cost).
 Materials were valued at an estimated average cost, a rudi-
mentary form of standard cost. A particularly interesting feature 
of line 2 of the job cost sheet for Job No. 1 is that the weight 
of materials included an allowance of approximately 6% (10 
ounces) for losses due to spoilage and shrinkage. The recogni-
tion of materials wastage was observed also by Zan [2004] in 
managerial and accounting discourse at the Venice Arsenal, 
and by Carmona and Gómez [2002] at the RTM of Guadala-
jara. Artisans, foremen, and apprentices were paid by piece rate. 
Manufacturing overheads, interest, non-manufacturing wages, 
and building and equipment repair were included at a pre- 
determined percentage of direct costs. The SFC was also one of 
the early entities to include interest in the identification of costs, 
as was the case with the Essex textile manufacturer, Thomas 
Griggs, 1742-1760, noted by Edwards [1989]. 
 Further, as with other firms noted by Edwards and Newell 
[1991], the SFC was aware of the imperative to recoup all its 
costs. This provided an incentive to control costs, particularly 
18
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during periods when market conditions squeezed profit levels. 
Total costs were expressed as averages, in cost units of “cost per 
covâdo.” (See Figure 1 where the unit cost of job order no. 1 was 
approximately 1$301 réis per covâdo.) Such averages would have 
been useful for control and efficiency assessment since these 
“units could be compared over time to provide indicators of 
changes in production costs of the pieces of silk and compared 
with the market price” [Edwards and Newell, 1991, p. 46]. The 
SFC had some controls over material usage, as we explain later. 
Although it was possible to exercise some control over payments 
made to each artisan and foreman, control of labor efficiency 
seems to have been lacking because foremen and artisans were 
paid according to the amount of production they completed. 
 Overheads were calculated as a percentage of direct costs 
as outlined earlier. But, as Gutiérrez et al. [2005, p. 131] note, 
“different foundations” for overhead allocation were used in the 
management accounting systems of the 13 large and medium-
sized 18th century Spanish companies they examined. The “stor-
age costs” of the Royal Textile Factory of Ezcaray were allocated 
on a flat rate of seven reales per unit and “damages and contin-
gencies” at 1.5% of production costs. The notion of “ability to 
bear” was an instrumental determinant of overhead allocation 
because “baling cost and the managers’ and accountants’ wages 
were allocated at a different rate for each type of fabric depend-
ing on its class – allowing higher rates for higher quality fabrics” 
(emphasis added). 
 The fact that the cost of each job order was computed in 
the “invoice book” leads to the belief that a major objective 
of  product costing at the SFC was to compute selling price. 
Although the SFC had been granted monopoly rights by the gov-
ernment to produce silk in Portugal, it suffered strong competi-
tion from small and big factories which were in operation when 
the SFC was created. The competition between the SFC and the 
companies from Trás-os-Montes is recognized by Sousa [2005, 
p. 3] who argues that “the second industrial boom (1720-1740), 
during the reign of D. João V, did not seem to have any positive 
impact on the revival of the Trás-os-Montes silk industry. On the 
contrary, the establishment of the Rato silk factory in Lisbon 
led to a fall in the demand for silk fabrics from Trás-os-Montes.” 
Most importantly, national silk fabrics were subject to competi-
tion from untaxed imported goods. King D. João V’s govern-
ment adopted a policy of taxing silk exports but allowing silk 
imports to remain tax-free. This arrangement made export and 
national sales very difficult for the SFC to achieve. “This was a 
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fatal mistake for agriculture and even more for manufacturing. 
Later, all developed nations, as did our King D. José I, adopted 
the opposite policy of facilitating exports and shutting out im-
ports” [Neves, 1827, p. 41]. To suggest that the SFC determined 
its own prices would be an over-simplification because prices 
for silk and silk products were influenced by market forces and 
governmental economic policy. Selling prices were not a func-
tion of cost plus a mark-up, but could vary. This can be seen by 
comparing sales prices and full costs by job order (in réis) in the 
following examples [ANTT, comparison of books 676 and 978]:
Figure 3
Job cost/sales price comparisons, 1745, sFc 
 Job total sales
 no. cost price (loss)
 10 631 620 (11)
 18 5$309 5$200 (109)
 29 1$988 1$800 (188)
 35 1$030 960 (70)
 40 1$403 1$300 (103)
This comparison suggests that there were difficulties in selling 
finished product. Indeed, the company’s sales were low in com-
parison to its level of production. As with the textiles factories 
in Ezcaray and Guadalajara [Gutiérrez et al., 2005, p. 136], the 
SFC had trouble selling its products in the market. Its costs were 
higher than the prevailing sales prices.
Other Important Accounts: The account “administration of 
fabric sales” (administração das vendas das fazendas da fabrica) 
was a partial profit and loss summary account [ANTT, book 
no. 978]. Sales of silk fabrics were credited to this account, 
and the full applied cost of goods sold debited, with an amount 
transferred from the finished goods account. The resulting bal-
ance, representing the expected trading surplus for the period, 
was transferred to the profit and loss account. The actual profit 
would have differed from this expected profit if, as was usual, 
there were differences between actual costs and applied costs. 
The profit and loss statement served mainly as “a weeding-out 
process, in which the detailed and unwanted information in the 
ledger was removed” [Yamey, 1977, p. 23]. 
 Two other important accounts were “dyed silks” (sedas 
tintas) and “general factory expenses” (gastos gerais da fabrica) 
[ANTT, ledger, book 718]. The dyed silks account was credited 
with the estimated costs to produce dyed silk and debited with 
20
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 34 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol34/iss1/5
77Carvalho, Rodrigues, and Craig: Portuguese Silk Factory
the actual costs incurred. The difference was transferred to the 
profit and loss account. “Dyed silks” was also an account on 
the balance sheet that was debited with the opening stock and 
credited with closing stock when charging the new administra-
tion. The “general factory expense” account was credited with 
applied cost and debited with actual cost; it was also a balance 
sheet debit account. The actual profit would have differed from 
this expected profit if, as would be usual, there were differences 
between actual costs, including actual overhead costs, and the 
applied costs, including applied overhead costs. 
 As Nikitin [1994] found in the cost accounting at the Forges 
D’Oberbrück Company (1738-1745), the cost accounting system 
revolved around the inventory accounts. However, at the SFC, 
the cost system was more sophisticated. The cost accounts and 
finished goods account were debited with the actual costs and 
credited with estimated costs. The differences were transferred 
to the profit account. The balance of the account “administra-
tion of fabric sales” showed the difference between sales and 
total estimated cost. The profit and loss account was composed 
of this value and the differences between actual and estimated 
costs. As with Bordázar’s cost accounting model [Martínez Guil-
lén, 2005], the profit and loss statement did not include depre-
ciation expense. Whenever a fixed asset had to be repaired, the 
cost was simply booked as an expense against the period.
Charge and Discharge System and DEB: In the transition from 
the first to the second administration, the company’s accounting 
system was a mixture of agency bookkeeping or “charge and dis-
charge” accounting and a system of double-entry accounting in-
corporating several costing procedures. The main characteristic 
of agency bookkeeping “is that the party reporting would charge 
himself with the values he became responsible for and discharge 
himself in the records for every release from responsibility 
regardless of the cause” [Littleton, 1933, p. 2]. Agency bookkeep-
ing systems were more common before the arrival of the Italian 
method of DEB. They were gradually abandoned around the 
middle of the 18th century when the transition from charge and 
discharge accounting to double-entry accounting, and the inte-
gration of the two systems, gained momentum [Jones, 1985, p. 
41]. Administrators at the SFC, particularly the cashier, Manoel 
Nunes da Silva Tojal, were responsible to promoters of the com-
pany for the capital resources placed in their hands. They were 
charged with these resources at the beginning of their admin-
istration [ANTT, book 718, pp. 4-8] and discharged at the end 
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[ANTT, book 720, pp. 192-197], as the opening page of the jour-
nal book (jornal) shows clearly. The inventory at the beginning 
of a new administration was important. It helped to establish 
what was owned by the company, what it owed creditors, and 
what its administration was accountable for. The words at the 
top of the inventory account state explicitly “this is the inventory 
delivered by the former administration to the new administra-
tors Mssrs. Manoel de Sande Vasconcelos, Christian Stockler, 
and Manoel Nunes da Silva Tojal who will be obliged to pay to 
creditors, not only the capital but also the interest from now on 
and these are the effects 22 [assets] that are being received.” The 
February 1, 1745 inventory appears as Figure 4 [ANTT, book no. 
718, pp. 4-8].
Figure 4
inventory, February 1, 1745, sFc
Dyed silks  6:655$062 
Raw silks  4:712$606
Silks in foliage  277$750
Raw silk strand  168$187
Dyed silk strand  25$510
Alducar for borders   8$276
Possolos and waste  108$021
Gold and silver strand   3:213$634 
General factory expenses  339$000 
Soap 112$761
Clothes awaiting shipment to Macao to Belchior Araújo Costa & Cª   3:880$580
Finished clothes  9:259$362
João José del Rey (debtor) 1:872$000
Pedro Villela (debtor)   252$000
Rev (Priest) José Oliveira da Patriarcal (debtor)   685$903
Francisco Sparsa Tintoreiro (dyer)   139$873 
  31:710$525
less what we owe to Mr. Manuel Nunes Silva Tojal 
 by his disbursement   12:800$000
  18:910$525
payment of the above 18:910$525 is to be made by this administration to the 
following creditors: 
Dean of the Patriarchal Holy Church   6:000$000 
Eugénia Marianna Gonzaga   600$000
Mother Abbess and other religious persons, Monastery of St. Marta  1:350$000
Mother Abbess and other religious persons, Monastery  
of the Mother of God, Guimarães (...)  4:800$000
Patricio Pires Quaresma   4:800$000
Rev. Priest Luís Gonzaga of Companhia de Jesus by the hand of 
Manoel de Sande e Vasconcelos 1:000$000
Rev. Priest José Dias of the Oratório Congregation  365$525 
   18:910$525
22Nikitin [1990] found the same word used to refer the inventory value of all 
assets of the Saint-Gobain Company.
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The company’s inventory account of 31:710$525 was comprised 
of inventories of direct and indirect materials, finished goods, 
and amounts owing from customers. This inventory had been 
financed through the deposit of 12:800$000 by the cashier and 
through loans of 18:910$525, principally from the Church. It was 
necessary to resort to such loans to overcome the lack of capital 
and to help meet the high costs of building the factory and 
houses. Therefore, the sum of the charge (31:710$525) exceeded 
that of the discharge (18:910$525) and measured the indebted-
ness of the new administration to the cashier, Manoel Nunes da 
Silva Tojal. From reading the Cash Account in the ledger, we can 
ascertain that the cashier deposited 12:800$000 on February 1, 
1745 and received it back on February 28, 1745. 
 As Lemarchand [1994] points out, the charge and discharge 
model depended on the separation between capital ownership 
and management, centered on notions of responsibility account-
ing, and resembled certain aspects observed in early joint-stock 
companies. However, it seems that the inability of the single- 
entry bookkeeping system to cope fully with the complexity of 
the SFC became evident in the first administration, prompting it 
to adopt a DEB system in its second administration. As Macedo 
[1982] argues, this period is characterized by “improvisation” in 
terms of managerial activities. This change can be understood in 
a context where DEB began to be seen in Portugal as a system 
of rational beliefs23 through which organizational structure is 
legitimized. As already noted, on July 3, 1745 the government 
auditor presented his report dated August 31, 1744. He con-
cluded that the losses were a consequence of the large amount of 
interest the company was paying on the substantial loans it had 
obtained to finance construction of the factory buildings [ANTT, 
Conselho da Fazenda, Maços, Decretos, 1725 e anos seguintes]. 
The prospect of changing to an accounting system which facili-
tated the control of interest costs by charging them to the cost of 
the products would probably have been appealing. 
Salaries and Wages: As with the RTM in Spain [Carmona and 
 Gómez, 2002, p. 233], Portugal had to hire foreign workers 
to provide technical skills in production and accounting. The 
salaries paid were very high as the wages for the three months 
to March 1745, shown below, reveal [ANTT, book no. 720]:
23The system of rational beliefs is evident in Pombal’s [1741b] treatise in 
which he concludes that the DEB system was being used successfully by mer-
chants in London. 
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Roberto Godin, factory manager 120$000
Nicolao Julio Cortinovis, bookkeeper  50$000
Carlos Roland, silk printer  75$000
João G. Rebelo  45$000
Bento Ferreira, Roberto Godin’s  
keeper (February/March)  12$000
Matias Patrão, factory porter  7$200 309$200
By the end of the second administration (1747), the salary of 
the bookkeeper (Cortinovis,24 effectively the SFC’s accountant) 
increased from 50$000 to 75$000 for a three month period. The 
best paid workers, Godin (the factory manager), Cortinovis, and 
Roland (a silk printer), had foreign names.
Balance Sheet: The balance sheet was very different from its 
equivalents today; it did not include capital, fixed assets, or 
depreciation. The accounting system was based on debits and 
credits not on assets and liabilities. This made it difficult to 
calculate the net worth of the company. But this did not seem to 
bother the proprietors of the SFC who were concerned princi-
pally with controlling agency relationships. Figure 5 is the Octo-
ber 31, 1747 balance sheet [ANTT, book no. 720]:
Figure 5
Balance sheet, sFc, october 31, 1747
Débito (Debit)
Shag and raw silks   9:154$210
Raw silks in foliage    650$725
Raw alducar for border    27$312
Raw silk strand    178$509
Dyed silks    10:322$525 
Colour dyed alducar   5$550
Colour dyed muzzle   15$875
Silk wastes   147$004
Gold and silver strand   1:903$132
Factory general expenses    413$530 
Dye    599$095
Soap for silk baking    64$550
Silk samples    60$375
24Lourenço Cortinovis was from Venice and was the nominated consul of Por-
tugal in Venice in 1720 [ANTT, Registo Geral de Mercês, D. João V, book 84, sheet 
117-V]. Our conjecture is that Nicolao Cortinovis was a relative, but we could not 
find evidence to substantiate this. The earthquake Lisbon sustained in 1755 de-
stroyed documents dealing with foreign affairs matters.
24
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Finished clothes held by sales administration   43:870$418
   [silk retail  42:208$726
   stocking pairs  1:661$692]
Shipment to Macao held by Caetano da Silva & Co.  2:087$050
Patriarchal Holy Church and for the Reverend Abbot José Oliveira   83$653
Cardinal of Motta (Prime Minister)  21$600
Maurício Henrique and João Andrade Dias  2:322$595
António Fragozo (debt of the Princes)   151$250
António José, artisan of this factory   6$325 
Francisco Duarte, artisan of this factory   6$000 
Cash    4:238$191 
    76:329$474
Crédito (Credit)
Monsignor Mattos    1:600$000
Dean of the Patriarchal Holy Church  6:000$000
Eugénia Marianna Gonzaga    600$000
Rev. Priest Luís Gonzaga of Companhia de Jesus  1:000$000
Mother Abbess and other religious persons, 
 Convent of Saint Apolónia  2:500$000
Marcos António de Araújo Coutinho   400$000
Jozé Rebello Palhares    4:000$000
Macao Company   17:000$000 
Ana Dorotheia de Sande Vasconcelos   30:540$700
Maria Custódia do Sacramento and her religious sisters in
 the Monastery of Saint Marta  1:350$000
Mother Abbess and other religious persons of the Monastery of 
 God Mother of Guimarães   4:800$000
Patrício Pires Quaresma    4:800$000
    74:590$700
Profit and Loss   1:738$774
    76:329$474
The balance sheet was concerned with chargeable values that 
needed closer control, so fixed assets and capital accounts were 
not included. Measuring the value of the company was not im-
portant.
 The debits appear to comprise cash and amounts paid in re-
spect of inventories (direct materials, indirect materials, finished 
goods in store, finished goods in transit), advances for wages of 
artisans, and amounts owing from customers and other debtors. 
Most of the credits comprise amounts owing on capital loans to 
the Catholic Church which, in this period, was acting as a bank. 
The excess of the debits over the credits was regarded as profit.
 The financial situation of the SFC reveals total indebted-
ness of 74:590$700. A large amount of the assets (43:870$418 of 
76:329$474) was represented by finished goods inventory. There 
was also an imbalance between inventories of raw materials 
and goods in process (22:981$858 or 30.1% of total assets) and 
25
Carvalho et al.: Early cost accounting practices and private ownership: The Silk Factory Company of Portugal, 1745-1747
Published by eGrove, 2007
Accounting Historians Journal, June 200782  
inventories of finished goods (57.5% of total assets). The SFC 
appears to have been suffering from overproduction and poor 
marketing.
DISCUSSION
 In the SFC’s second administration, administrators were 
faced with a challenging socio-economic climate. Their re-
sponse, which included enhancements to the SFC’s accounting 
system, offers support to “Fleischman and Parker’s hypothesis 
that accounting innovations were often the product of percep-
tive businessmen struggling with real problems” [Boyns and 
Edwards, 1995, p. 48]. 
 Further, the SFC’s adoption of more elaborate calculative 
routines might be conceived as reflecting “specific rationales 
and ideals of order which the state valued and sought for the 
governance of society” [Bhimani, 1994, p. 407]. The French 
mercantilist ideas that were spreading in Portugal prompted the 
development of industry and state control. The SFC had been 
granted privileges, monopoly rights and some tax exemptions, 
from the state, and was to be audited by a government audi-
tor. Because of this, the accounting system of the SFC might be 
perceived as “enrolled in certain pursuits of the state and as 
assuming ‘its place alongside other practices of Government’” 
[Bhimani, 1994, p. 407]. King D. João V and Prime Minister 
Cardeal da Mota wanted to add to the power and independence 
of Portugal, and attempted to do this by embracing the ideals of 
French mercantilism, particularly Colbert’s ideas. This required 
the SFC to institute an efficient and modern system of book-
keeping which would allow good control and oversight of opera-
tions. The calculative routines used by the SFC were capable of 
improving the company’s control of operations, and accorded 
with the state-sponsored mercantilist ethic of the time.
 The development of several of the cost accounting practices 
evident at the SFC is often attributed to the factory system of 
the industrial revolution [Littleton, 1933; Johnson, 1981]. The 
accounting system observed at the SFC, 1745-1747, is consistent 
with Garner’s [1954] argument that the initial impetus for the 
development of cost accounting was to replace the domestic sys-
tem of production with the capitalist processes of production, 
and that the British Industrial Revolution (1760-1830) was not 
the main stimulus for change but merely accelerated the pace of 
pre-existing change. 
 The SFC’s accounting system is noteworthy also because 
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it integrated the cost and financial records in a DEB system 
that included elements of a charge and discharge accounting 
(or agency bookkeeping) system. The SFC operated a job-order 
costing system that allocated overhead costs to products, al-
lowed for direct materials shrinkage, and included interest cost 
as an indirect product cost. Elements of a rudimentary standard 
raw material costing system were evident. The SFC’s balance 
sheet did not include fixed assets, accumulated depreciation, 
or a statement of owners’ equity. The profit and loss account 
included interest costs but not depreciation expense. 
 The cost and management accounting practices used by the 
SFC support the contention [e.g., by Fleischman and Parker, 
1990, 1991; Edwards and Newell, 1991; Boyns and Edwards, 
1997] that many of the cost and management accounting proce-
dures used today had origins and exemplars prior to the British 
Industrial Revolution, particularly in the first half of the 18th 
century. The SFC’s cost accounting practices are also consistent 
broadly with case descriptions of the accounting systems that 
were used in Spain in the first half of the 18th century [Carmona 
et al., 1997; Carmona and Gómez, 2002; Gutiérrez et al., 2005]. 
 The example of the accounting system at the SFC adds 
weight to the contention that the development of management 
accounting was a response to multiple influences, and that it 
ought not to be explained in terms of any single variable alone, 
such as the level of industrialization, the relative impact of fixed 
and variable costs, or the organizational structure of business 
activity [Edwards, 1989; Edwards and Newell, 1991]. The cost 
and management practices of the SFC are a rich source for fur-
ther enquiry. The inventory of 34 accounting books of the SFC, 
listed in Appendix 1, are an under-explored archival resource 
that merits closer enquiry by scholars fluent in the Portuguese 
language. Such enquiry might explore the transformation of the 
SFC into a state-owned company in the 1750s under the leader-
ship of Pombal, perhaps helping us to understand the “inter-
relations of accounting and the state” and accounting change 
[Miller, 1990, p. 316]. In particular, the transition to state owner-
ship may shed light on how ownership structure affects the cost 
and financial accounting systems of business entities.
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appendiX 1
inventory of accounting Books of the  
Real Fábrica das Sedas
This inventory of 1115 accounting books includes 34 for the Companhia da Fá-
brica das Sedas: 
 period  Book no.
1.1 Accounting
 1.1.1 Main accounting books
   Ledger (Livro Mestre) 1745-47 718
   Journal (Livro Jornal) 1745-47 720
   Inventory 1745 214
 1.1.2 Auxiliary accounting books
   Cash 1746 267
   Account of the amount the house cost 1735-44 536
   Partnerships entries 1734-42 980
   Sheet of the partners’ interest 1735-47 303
    1738-47 304
    1735-54 305
    1735-45 306
    1738-50 537
   Current accounts of partnerships 1734-45 797
   Invoices from abroad 1745-47 516
    1747-49 523
   Shipments 1735-45 712
   Debtors waste-book 1735-49 520
    1747-48 530
   Foremen wages 1745-47 521
    1747-50 290
   Several accounts waste-book 1745-47 522
1.2 Crude Silk Warehouse and Materials
 1.2.1 Warehouse
   Entrance and exit of silk and other products 1734-45 1054
    1747-51 1050
   Entrance and exit of silk to the socks factory 1747-50 1051
 1.2.2 Dye-house
   Dyers account 1747-50  289
1.3 Tint Silk Warehouse
 1.3.1 Warehouse
   Entrance and exit of silk and other products 1745-47  574
    1747-50 1049
 1.3.2 Silk clothes
   Computation of the cost of silk cloth (the 1745-46  676
   original title of this book was “Invoices book”) 1746-47  675
1.4  Sale
 1.4.1 Sale warehouse
   Entrance and exit of silk cloth 1734-45 1020
    1745-47  978
    1747-50  621
 1.4.2 Shop of the company at Douradores Street
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   Entrance and exit of silk cloth 1747-50 1048
   Sales of the shop waste-book 1745-48  758
    1747-50  524
These books are related to the three administrations in the following way, with 
some common to two or three administrations:
 administration
 1  2  3 1,2 2,3 1,2,3 total
Main accounting books   3      3
Auxiliary accounting books 5  4  3  2   3  17
Crude silk warehouse 1   3     4
Tint silk warehouse   2  1   1   4
Sales 1  1  3   1   6
Total 7 10 10  2  2  3  34
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